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MODE R N I T Y A N D G E N DE R I N A R A B AC C OU N T S OF TH E 1 9 4 8 A N D 1 9 6 7 DE F E ATS
The victory which the Zionists have achieved . . . lies not in the superiority of one people over another, but rather in the superiority of one system over another. The reason for this victory is that the roots of Zionism are grounded in modern Western life while we for the most part are still distant from this life and hostile to it. They live in the present and for the future while we continue to dream the dreams of the past and to stupify ourselves with its fading glory. 1 Twentieth-century Zionist and British representations of Palestine relied strongly on modernizing and "civilizing" narratives to legitimate Palestine's colonization. 2 Similar to the usually racist and always ethnocentric discourses justifying such projects, the colonization of Palestine has often been portrayed as the introduction of social, political, and scienti˜c "progress" and economic development to "backward" peoples and places. 3 This article is primarily concerned with the responses of many Arab "organic" and "traditional" intellectuals, 4 largely nationalist, to the Arab defeats in the 1948 and 1967 wars. As indicated in Constantine Zurayk's account, cited above, these intellectual accounts largely concurred with Zionist and British colonial discourses that Arab "backwardness"-economic, cultural, political, and military-had contributed to the Arab defeats. Consequently, these political counter-elites came to see the ideological, cultural, and material "modernization" of Arab societies as critical to any eˆort to recover Palestine.
My contention that social auto-criticism permeates Palestinian and Arab discussion of the 1948 war is contrary to Rashid Khalidi's argument that the Palestinian national narrative has included little self-criticism since the 1948 war, and that it often de˜nes "failure as triumph."
5 Although triumphalist narratives, particularly by Palestinian and Arab political leaders, have been ubiquitous, criticisms of disorganization, disunity, self-interest, and "backwardness," and their roles in the 1948 defeat, have been even more common and have appeared more frequently in the wake of the 1967 war.
Anti-colonial movements and post-colonial states often saw "modernization" as the only eˆective response to colonial and neo-colonial domination. 6 Given the technological, economic, and military underpinnings of European colonization, it is not surprising that many anti-colonial elites and counter-elites believed that resistance to colonization required the acquisition of these aspects of modernity. Thus, despite the many ideological diˆerences that developed among the Arab nationalist movements after both wars, the necessity of transforming political, cultural, economic, and military backwardness into modernity and progress was a pervasive theme.
Most Palestinian nationalists assumed that this modernization required women's political participation, mobilization in war eˆorts, education, employment, and equal citizenship rights in the "public sphere." The project, particularly when envisioned by men, however, left gender inequality in so-called private realms either unaddressed or only vaguely considered. 7 In addition, the project did not probe the assumptions about gender contained in the terms citizenship , self-determination , and even employment. Without destabilizing the existing patriarchal order, the emancipatory potential of these outcomes for women was limited. Indeed, when imagined by men, these ideas were almost always premised on a male colonized (and potentially liberated) national subject.
Although most nationalist activists did not examine these assumptions about gender, concern about masculinity norms that required kinsmen to protect women's bodies from other men appears to have contributed to the Palestinian exodus during the 1948 and 1967 wars. In this light, I revisit accounts of the Deir Yassin massacre, an event that continues to be symbolically important in analyses of the 1948 war. Although this massacre is widely recognized as a turning point in the 1948 war and as having greatly encouraged the Palestinian refugee exodus, the gender-related impact of the massacre on the exodus has largely been ignored in debates about "why Palestinians left." I argue that nationalist activists came to view women's protection norms as manifestations of backwardness that functioned ideologically to legitimate (for Europe) and practically to facilitate (by encouraging Palestinian ˘ight) the appropriation of Palestine by the ostensibly more modern Zionist movement. This may explain why many of these activists assumed that, in order to recover their homeland, they had to recast gender norms related to defending the "honor" invested in protecting women's bodies from sexual and physical violation. The existence of this nationalist concern is demonstrated by the nationalist slogan al-ar d qabl al-çir d ("land before honor").
The "land before honor" slogan and calls for "progress" with respect to the inclusion of women in the public sphere were to a large extent utilitarian (because conservative gender norms were viewed as barriers to national liberation). In addition, I argue that far from being traditional or anti-modern, the gender ideologies and practices of these organic and traditional intellectuals can be explained at least partly by the gendered ambivalences, silences, and (re)presentations common in most nationalist, Marxist, and liberal discourses.
Because so little is explicitly articulated with respect to gender in nationalist narratives about the 1948 and 1967 defeats, I address the signi˜cance of the absent as well as the present. In doing so, I hope to contribute to an interdisciplinary feminist scholarship asserting the importance of placing women, men's relations to women, and gender as a symbolic system at the center of intellectual inquiry, even when the topic does not appear to be about women. Addressing gender as an analytical cate-gory can make axiomatic assumptions requiring explanation discursively visible. Moreover, it can pave the way for often necessary reconceptualizations of historical events and theoretical categories. 8 
MODERNITY AND GENDER IN POST-1948 ACCOUNTS OF "TRADITIONAL" INTELLECTUALS
The always shifting contours of Palestinian national identity have been intricately tied to the collective traumas Palestinians have experienced. 9 The most profound of these traumas was the establishment of the State of Israel on 15 May 1948, after Zionist forces captured most of historic Palestine, emptying the occupied areas of more than 700,000 Palestinians. At least two themes can be found in most of the intellectual accounts that followed the 1948 defeat. The ˜rst is that the defeat made sense given the overwhelming economic, political, and military resources of the Zionist movement and its supporters, particularly Britain. The second is more autocritical, at least partly attributing Arab defeat to the cultural and political "modernity" of the Zionist movement, whose members were assumed to have high levels of education and economic development; non-traditional orientations; rationalbureaucratic (not semi-feudal or clan-based) political organizations; a highly coherent ideology; and disciplined cadres. 10 Far from denying responsibility for the 1948 defeat, accounts by Arab activists and intellectuals frequently contained criticism of their own societies; economic, political, and social "backwardness" not only in Palestine, but in the Arab world generally, were blamed for the Arab defeat.
Two classic examples of such auto-criticism after the 1948 defeat are Zurayk's The Meaning of the Disaster (1956) and Musa al-çAlami's The Lesson of Palestine (1949). 11 These post-1948 accounts are forgiving of past mistakes and hopeful about the future, outlining a modernizing agenda that the authors believed would lead to the recovery of Palestine. This agenda was speci˜c and all-encompassing in relation to the public sphere, but more vague in relation to issues of the private sphere and gender inequality. For example, these leftist and liberal modernizers appear to have viewed women's incorporation into political, military, and economic structures as an important aspect of a progressive agenda, but they say little about how to accomplish this. Moreover, they do not provide a fundamental critique of the patriarchal system that bolsters and legitimates gender inequality, indicating that this was not an important aspect of their modernizing projects.
The Arabs, contended al-çAlami, ultimately lost the 1948 war because they proceeded along the lines of previous revolutions, while the Jews proceeded along the lines of total war; that we worked on a local basis, without unity, without totality, without a general command, our defense disjointed and our aˆairs disordered, . . . while the Jews conducted the war with a uni˜ed organization, a uni˜ed command, and total conscription. Our arms were poor and de˜cient; the arms of the Jews were excellent and powerful. It was obvious that our aims in the battle were diverse; the aim of the Jews was solely to win it. 12 Reversing Arab fortunes also required a transformation of Arab culture-indeed, nationalism did not succeed in the West, according to Zurayk, until a "breaking down of feudalism (not to mention tribalism), sectarianism, fatalism, and occultism," 13 the quintessential symptoms of backwardness in Arab nationalist accounts, had occurred. Nationalism prevailed only "when the machine appeared and a primitive, static, disunited system of economics and of living was transformed into a dynamic, specialized, interdependent system, when the powerful barriers between diˆerent classes of people were lowered, and when organized, logical knowledge spread." 14 Nationalism and "the development of thought and action" that parallels it are incompatible "with the institutions or mentality of ancient times or of the Middle Ages." 15 Zurayk argued: "A progressive, dynamic mentality will never be stopped by a primitive, static mentality." 16 Transformation required, among other things, the acquisition of "the machine," which would "guarantee the destruction of tribalism, feudalism, and other characteristics that stand in the way of nationalism." It also demanded that the "nation's cultural eˆorts must be directed toward the realization of the greatest possible degree of scienti˜c organization, keeping as far away as possible from benumbing fancy and insubstantial romanticism." 17 Despite the apparent inclusiveness of these accounts, the modern national subject appeared to be a man. With the exception of speci˜c statements that military mobilization should fully include girls and women, 18 as it did in the Zionist movement, al-çAlami and Zurayk rarely referred to or speci˜ed the transformation of a patriarchal gender order. For example, after discussing a number of "rights" of the people, including freedom of speech, beliefs, and political organizing; "freedom from want"; social equality before the law and "in every aspect of life"; the right to work; compulsory state-funded primary education for girls and boys; accessible secondary, vocational, and university education for "all children equally"; social security; and health care, al-çAlami states that "in all these rights and duties, the woman must be equal to the man, so that she may share in the formation of this new Arab society." 19 This reference to girls and women focuses on state-guaranteed and provisioned political, economic, and educational freedoms and rights in the public sphere.
The silence in these post-1948 critiques about the eˆect that gender "honor" codes may have had on the refugee exodus and the 1948 defeat is striking. The "leadership," or Arab political elites, rather than the "masses" were blamed for the defeat. Indeed, the replacement of the urban and wealthy notable leadership of the Palestinian National Movement after the 1948 war with a younger, more ideologically radical and diverse group (in terms of region, nationality, and class, if not gender) was a response to the perception that this "old-fashioned" leadership had betrayed the national cause to its class and clan interests. Not addressed in these critiques, however, is the possibility that some of the Palestinian "masses" may have left because their commitment to the requirement for defense of women's bodies had superseded any "modern" nationalist identity or duty to remain in their villages and towns.
HONOR AND THE IMPACT OF THE DEIR YASSIN MASSACRE ON THE REFUGEE EXODUS
Having heard-or rather, not heard-the story of exile from my family, I was always struck by what was not said. Why did Palestinians leave their homes when there were a few who chose to stay? Why was the resistance so feeble? And why do most people refuse to face these fundamental issues of survival? 20 The question, "Why did the Palestinians leave?" has been an important preoccupation of research on 20th-century Palestine. However, these researchers generally have not considered the impact of gender ideology and norms (particularly those related to honor) on the Palestinian refugee exodus in 1948, nationalist anxieties about the impact of such ideas and practices about gender on the exodus, or the implications of such anxieties for 20th-century Palestinian nationalism. I probe these issues by focusing on how the Deir Yassin massacre has been represented and how its occurrence and representations may have been interpreted and acted upon by some Palestinian refugees.
Like most Palestinians during that period, peasant men who were active in the 1936-39 Palestinian revolt against British rule viewed honor as intimately (but not exclusively) related to possession of land and the maintenance of kin women's virginity (when unmarried) or exclusive sexual availability (when married). 21 Violations of women's chastity norms (by women and men) led to the loss of family honor and, if discovered, required some response from male kin to regain that honor. Popular anxiety about gender-related violations of honor were particularly pronounced during wars with non-Muslim men, who were considered not to be bound by honor codes of Muslim warfare that prohibit sexual and physical attacks against Muslim women, including "enemy" women. 22 Ted Swedenburg argues that after 1948, collective "loss of land to Zionist colonization came to be regarded as an aˆront to the national honor." 23 Thus, it appears that with the loss of Palestinian land and the concern that the refugee exodus had been motivated partly by a desire to protect women's bodies from violation, a nationalist narrative emerged that attempted to rede˜ne honor. In this new formulation, traditional conceptions of honor were exclusively concerned with control over women's bodies; "modern" honor was dependent on national autonomy and control of land; and control over land and national dignity should supersede women's protection honor codes. According to this nationalist discursive reworking, men could succeed individually in "protecting" women ( çir d ) and still not possess honor ( sharaf ) if they did not protect national land claims-thus, the development of the slogan "land before honor" ( al-ar d qabl al-çir d ). 24 The slogan became prominent in Palestinian nationalist discourse particularly after the 1967 war. 25 This slogan, I argue, indicates that anxiety about traditional norms requiring the protection of women's bodies was salient among modernist nationalists after 1948, although they were not elaborated as often as were concerns about economic and political modernization. Nationalists appear to have been worried that sexual conservatism, elaborated as a concern with family honor, was partly responsible for the refugee exodus and loss of Palestine.
Nationalist elites were not incorrect in this respect. Many Palestinian refugees do appear to have left in order to protect the family honor that is invested in protecting the bodies of female kin. Contemporary research in Lebanon, Jordan, and the Occupied Territories indicates that this issue was certainly discussed frequently by regular Palestinians. Julie Peteet writes:
During the 1940s, popular Palestinian thinking [in 1970s Lebanon] contends, women were targets of the campaign to rid Palestine of its native inhabitants. In fact, it asserts attacks on women were carried out with the full knowledge and anticipation that Arab notions of honor would incite Palestinians to remove their families from the path of danger. 26 Based on her research in the Occupied Territories in the 1980s, Kitty Warnock provides a similar account:
The supremacy of this demand [men's protection of women from all danger, but particularly from sexual impurity] over other aspects of honour was demonstrated in 1948, when many of the Palestinian families who ˘ed their homes did so primarily out of fear that their women would be raped by Zionist soldiers. This was an old fear, but one that the Zionists, apparently through careful preparatory study of Palestinian society, had realised still had potent. 27 Similarly, a Palestinian refugee in Lebanon who had become a Resistance Movement leader recounted to Rosemary Sayigh:
One of the political errors of our leadership was that they didn't prevent evacuation. We should have stayed. I had a ri˘e and a Sten gun. My father told me, "The Zionists are coming, you know what they do to girls, take your two sisters and go to Lebanon." I said, "I prefer to shoot my sisters, and shoot you all [to insure against losing family honor], and keep the last bullet for myself. This would be better than leaving." Then they took our village and I was arrested. 28 Sayigh makes clear that "the mass of peasants were terri˜ed not just of military attack, but also of rape. . . . The obligation of brothers to guard their sisters became a cause of con˘ict in many families, particularly when this obligation clashed with the younger man's patriotism." 29 Other indications exist of a generation gap between some younger and older men with respect to de˜nitions of honor. One female refugee who had been an adolescent during the uprooting reported that, when her brother insisted to their father than he would not leave Palestine, "My father talked to him about honour and his sisters-there was no political consciousness among the old generation." 30 A number of refugees from the 1948 war interviewed by Nafez Nazzal in the early 1970s similarly referred implicitly or directly to sexual assaults, or the fear of sexual assaults, as an impetus for leaving Palestine. 31 Such accounts also indicate that, like all identities, 32 Palestinian identities were and are not seamless, unitary, or particularly stable, and they are often imbricated with other identities, locations, and beliefs.
In a study of refugees from the 1967 war who were in Jordan in the immediate aftermath of that war, almost one-third of a random sample of 100 families "mentioned the fear of dishonor as one of the major reasons for leaving," 33 indicating that such issues continued to be salient among many Palestinians almost twenty years after 1948. It is thus not surprising that many nationalists were likely to have seen conceptions of honor that were linked to the protection of women's bodies as at least somewhat responsible for the 1948 defeat.
The event that most symbolized the violation of honor and is most evocative of the 1948 war for many Palestinians is the massacre in the Jerusalem village of Deir Yassin. In the early morning of 9 April 1948, Jewish forces invaded Deir Yassinwhich had signed a non-aggression pact with a nearby Jewish settlement-and killed many of its inhabitants. 34 Women who remained alive were reportedly raped, and houses were looted and dynamited, gunned, and grenaded. 35 I am interested in a number of issues related to this massacre, such as: to what extent was the panicked civilian response to the massacre related to fear of the possibility of sexual assault by Zionist forces? How has the impact of extant women's protection codes on the refugee exodus been addressed by intellectual debates about the 1948 war? Why do Palestinian nationalist activists in the post-1948 period avoid addressing this issue?
A number of important methodological and ethical considerations must be addressed when joining the proli˜c and continuing discussion of "why Palestinians left" during the 1948 war. First, it is very di¯cult to extricate what occurred during the war generally, and the Deir Yassin massacre speci˜cally-particularly with respect to the existence and prevalence of sexual assault-from the exigencies of political narratives and the vagaries of memory.
Second, although signi˜cant evidence exists that the Deir Yassin massacre had a momentous impact beyond the village, we cannot know, without systematic research among immediate post-exodus refugees (research that does not exist), whether concern with family honor was a signi˜cant concern among most, some, few, or none of those civilians who left. The last scenario-none-appears to be the least likely, given the general fears of refugees (discussed earlier) and the nature of popular responses to the Deir Yassin massacre in particular (discussed later). Despite these limitations, an examination of the implications regarding gender of the Deir Yassin massacre is critical, especially given the event's symbolic importance in accounts of the 1948 war. Surprisingly, the continuing debate about "why Palestinians left" in 1948 has largely ignored the implications of gender for the exodus generally, and responses to the Deir Yassin massacre in particular.
Finally, although the existing evidence indicates concern about family honor among at least some 1948 refugees, it also indicates that leaving was probably civilians' most rational response, given the physical assaults, bombings, shootings, and starvation through systematic siege, as well as the dramatic imbalance of power between the Palestinian population (armed and civilian) and Jewish forces. It is ironically consistent with the often exceptionalist international treatment of the Palestinian-Israeli con˘ict that discussions of the Palestinian refugee problem do not assume these refugees' right of return and often include a subtext that blames civilians for leaving a war zone.
A number of accounts have discussed the occurrence of sexual assaults during the Deir Yassin massacre. Assistant Inspector Richard Catling, the British investigator of the massacre, described the di¯culty of obtaining statements from "hysterical" women who remained alive. These women, he wrote, often break down . . . whilst the statement is being recorded. There is, however, no doubt that many sexual atrocities were committed by the attacking Jews. Many young schoolgirls were raped and later slaughtered. Old women were also molested. 36 These women and girls who had survived the massacre were interviewed in the village of Silwan by Catling and a "doctor, nurse, and a representative of the [Arab] Woman's Union." 37 Other reports of sexual assault during the Deir Yassin massacre are included in the French version of O Jerusalem : Sa˜yeh Attiyeh, a 41-year-old woman, saw one man open his pants and leap on her. "I screamed," she said, "but around me other women were being raped, too. Then they ripped oˆ our clothes and played with our breasts while making obscene gestures." 38 The possibility of attacks on Palestinian girls and women similar to those reported to have occurred in Deir Yassin worried many refugees and aˆected their decisions to leave during the war, according to many accounts. These narratives indicate that part of the Deir Yassin massacre's impact was not only that a "peaceful village" had been so brutalized by Zionist forces, but that girls' and women's bodies were violated through "non-sexual" physical violence, sexual assault, and undressing, thus transgressing honor norms and creating great fear among families. Salma Khadra Jayyusi, who lived in Jerusalem at the time, reported in a recent essay on the Deir Yassin massacre that "[r]umors had quickly circulated about rape and cold-blooded butchery." 39 Similarly, in her diary, Hala Sakakini wrote:
Lately, ever since the massacre at Deir Yasin, we have been thinking seriously of leaving Jerusalem. The most terrible stories have been received from eyewitnesses who have escaped from this unbelievable massacre. I never thought the Jews could be so cruel, so barbarous, so brutal. Pregnant women and children were tortured to death, young women were stripped naked, humiliated and driven through the Jewish Quarters to be spit upon by the crowds. 40 Many Palestinian refugees from 1948 whom Nazzal interviewed in the 1970s also referred to the Deir Yassin massacre as a strong impetus for exodus; they reported hearing of the massacre from village radios and newspapers brought in by those who had traveled into town. 41 Part of the massacre's impact was clearly related to the threat of sexual assault for these refugees. 42 The specter of the Deir Yassin massacre, particularly as an example of the possibility of the violation of women's bodies, also surfaced in interviews with 1967 refugees in Jordan, most of whom were from the Jerusalem and Jericho areas of the West Bank. More than a third of them were "old refugees," having been displaced in 1948 and in 1967. 43 Many accounts have addressed the Deir Yassin massacre as a turning point in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. The massacre came to epitomize the Zionists' willingness to commit atrocities in order to establish a state. The circulation of news and propaganda related to this massacre contributed substantially to a breakdown of morale and to increased panic among Palestinians. According to Simha Flapan, the massacre is "considered by most historians to have been the direct reason for the ˘ight of the Arabs from Haifa on April 21 and from Jaˆa on May 4, and for the ˜nal collapse of the Palestinian ˜ghting forces." 44 Jacques de Reynier, head of the delegation in Palestine of the International Committee of the Red Cross during the 1948 hostilities, arrived at the scene of the massacre a day after it had occurred:
The aˆair of Deir Yassin had immense repercussions. The press and radio spread the news everywhere among Arabs as well as the Jews. In this way a general terror was built up among the Arabs, a terror astutely fostered by the Jews. On both sides, it was made into a political argument, and the results were tragic. Driven by fear, the Arabs left their homes tõ nd shelter among their kindred. . . . Finally, about 700,000 Arabs became refugees, leaving everything behind in their haste, their one hope being to avoid the fate of the people of Deir Yassin. 45 Musa al-çAlami wrote in his biography:
At ˜rst the Arab ˘ight from Palestine was only a trickle, consisting mostly either of the inhabitants of isolated settlements . . . or some of the more well-to-do families who, sensing trouble ahead, followed the immemorial desert-bred custom of moving elsewhere until it should blow over. But in April the news spread-and lost nothing on the way-that the Irgun Zvai Leumi had perpetrated a ghastly massacre of the people of Deir Yasin, a small village west of Jerusalem, throwing 250 bodies, all of old men, women, or children, into the village well and driving the few survivors naked in trucks to the outskirts of Jerusalem; and this was followed, a few days later, by news of a similar massacre at Nasir-ed-Deir [ sic ], 46 near Tiberias. Then fear gripped the countryside, and the trickle of refugees became a ˘ood. 47 Menachem Begin, a member of the Irgun Zvai Leumi, one of the radical Zionist military organizations involved in the massacre, argued that although no "Jewish atrocities" were committed in Deir Yassin, propagandists' publicizing such events "helped us" by creating "panic" among Palestinians:
Kolonia village, which had previously repulsed every attack of the Haganah [formal Zionist army], was evacuated overnight and fell without further ˜ghting. Beit-Iksa was also evacuated. . . . Not what happened in Dir Yassin, but what was invented about Dir Yassin, helped to carve the way to our decisive victories on the battle˜eld. . . . All the Jewish forces proceeded to advance through Haifa like a knife through butter. The Arabs began ˘eeing in panic, shouting: "Dir Yassin!" 48 Begin's account is part of a continuing debate over whether a deliberate Zionist plan existed to empty villages of their Palestinian residents. Operative de˜nitions of "coercion" have been critically important in this debate. How many Palestinians were expelled literally at gunpoint? How many left because they were "merely" afraid? Were their fears justi˜ed or imagined? Did the country empty of more than 700,000 people as a result of a systematic, pre-planned operation, or was it the de facto result of war? 49 Benny Morris, for example, argues that the "Palestinian refugee problem was born of war, not by design, Jewish or Arab. It was largely a by-product of Arab and Jewish fears of the protracted, bitter ˜ghting that characterised the ˜rst Israeli-Arab war; in smaller part, it was the deliberate creation of Jewish and Arab military commanders and politicians." 50 He insists, in a later response to criticisms by Norman Finkelstein and Nur Masalha, that the "Yishuv" did not have a pre-planned, systematic policy of expulsion. 51 Finkelstein, in contrast, argues that "Zionist policy throughout was one of expulsion," and Morris's historical documentation supports such a conclusion, even if Morris did not reach it. 52 Nur Masalha argues that Morris's documentation, as well as Masalha's own analysis of Hebrew-language documents, strongly indicate a Zionist "transfer policy" for the Palestinian population during the 1948 war. Moreover, Masalha asks, " [D] oes it matter in the end whether such a policy was actually formulated, or whether it was just de facto and clearly understood at every level of military and political decision-making?" 53 Simha Flapan similarly argues that the Zionist army's "Plan Dalet" systematically outlined a plan to destroy and empty villages of their Palestinian populations:
The psychological aspect of warfare was not neglected either. The day after the plan went into eˆect, the Lebanese paper al-Hayat quoted a lea˘et that was dropped from the air and signed by the Haganah command in Galilee: "We have no wish to ˜ght ordinary people who want to live in peace, but only the army and forces which are preparing to invade Palestine. Therefore . . . all people who do not want this war must leave together with their women and children in order to be safe. This is going to be a cruel war, with no mercy or compassion. There is no reason why you should endanger yourselves." Exactly how cruel and merciless was already clear from the example of the Dir Yassin massacre. 54 As already shown, despite disagreement on the issue of Zionist intent and policy, there is much agreement in these and other accounts that public response to the Deir Yassin massacre was critically important in producing a panic that led to exodus. 55 Importantly, however, most discussions of the massacre and debates about "why Palestinians left" avoid addressing the possibility that fear of sexual assault may have been a goal of this "psychological warfare" and may have signi˜cantly aˆected the refugee exodus-despite many indications from Palestinian refugees that the massacre's signi˜cance and impact was partly related to reports and fear of sexual assaults.
The implications of the answer to the question, "Why did the Palestinians leave?" extend beyond repatriation and compensation and have been important in de˜ning 20th-century Palestinian nationalism. Arguing that Palestinians left "voluntarily" in 1948 implied that they were not signi˜cantly attached to the land, playing into a traditional Zionist argument that Palestinians did not exist as a modern national community and could easily settle in other parts of the Arab world. The lack of such a national identity, as evidenced by voluntary exodus, also implied that there was no legitimate basis for an independent Palestinian state.
Allegiance to bases of honor regarding protection of women ˜t neatly into the Zionist narrative of Palestinian backwardness, and a similar point of view was adopted by most Palestinian secular nationalists. One possible explanation for the silence surrounding gender in Arab and Palestinian analyses of the 1948 defeat may be the perceived incongruity of traditional concerns with protecting women's bodies (and thereby family honor) with modernist claims to nationhood. Nationalists viewed such conceptions of honor as obstacles to national self-determination in the Palestinian context, and this view became particularly strident with the intensi˜ed political activity of the late 1960s, when increasing numbers of young Palestinian women became involved in nationalist, including military, activity.
"TRADITIONAL" AND "ORGANIC" INTELLECTUAL RESPONSES TO THE 1967 DEFEAT
As happened in 1948, Arab and Palestinian auto-critical accounts explained the 1967 war in terms of a victory of Western and Zionist modernity-organization, uni˜ed ideology, military power, and economic development-over Arab and Palestinian "backwardness"-feudalism, corruption, national disunity and competition, military disorganization, and economic underdevelopment. In this section, I use the work of two Arab intellectuals and the ideologies and practice of post-1967 Palestinian leftist-nationalist parties as evidence of this continued uncritical adoption of the modernity-backwardness framework to explain political crises in the Arab world. I also discuss the implications and contradictions of these modernist discourses on gender.
Sadiq Jalal al-çAzm, a professor of modern European philosophy at Damascus University and author of a number of in˘uential works in Arabic, 56 has been one of the best-known modernists in the Arab world since 1967. In the widely acclaimed Self-Criticism after the Defeat (1968), al-çAzm compared the 1967 Arab-Israeli war to the 1904 Japanese-Russian war, arguing that Japan won in its surprise military attack against the Russian Empire because it had learned from and copied the ways in which battles were waged by "modern civilizations" and, in response, developed "industry, technology, organized scienti˜c research, and skills training." 57 In contrast to the Russians in the post-1904 period, who learned from their mistakes, the Arabs, argued al-çAzm, have attempted to "shirk responsibilities for the [1967] defeat..and attribut [e] it to external forces that we have no control over, which has allowed us to vindicate ourselves from embarrassment and our coming up short in our responsibilities toward the primary Arab cause and toward . . . modern civilization in general." 58 Similar to Zurayk's and al-çAlami's critiques twenty years earlier, al-çAzm's Critique of Religious Thought (1969) called for a "critical, scienti˜c analysis" recognizing that the "corpse of traditional feudal society has been shredded by the machine, and its bones have crumbled under the weight of modern economic and social organization, and with it has passed the fateful, positive attitude toward religion." 59 He argued that one of the most important problems that had to be addressed directly by Arab intellectuals and activists was the "struggle between science and religion (Islam, for us)." 60 In reviewing this period in an interview commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the 1967 war, al-çAzm reminisced about how he and other Arab intellectuals had believed that the radical wing of the Arab liberation movement needed to challenge the more conservative nationalist trends and Islamist ideologies because "of the ability of this body of thought to continually reproduce the values of ignorance, myth-making, backwardness, dependency, and fatalism, and to impede the propagation of scienti˜c values, secularism, enlightenment, democracy, and humanism." 61 Al-çAzm viewed the "modernization" of Arab society as a necessary "cultural project" that completed the Arab renaissance that began in the late 19th century. 62 Similarly, Hisham Sharabi has argued that instead of the clean break with "tradition" that occurred during the European Renaissance, the "Arab awakening" ( nahda ) of the late 19th century "did not achieve a genuine transcendence of inherited structures of thought and social (including economic and political) organization, and . . . failed to grasp the true nature of modernity." 63 "For a society not to be modern in the contemporary world," he argues, "exacts a crippling price. . . . Modernity, in one of its most vital aspects, should help both the individual and the society realize their greatest potential." 64 The Arab world, Sharabi argued, is a "neopatriarchal society," which he de˜ned as a dependent, nonmodern socio-economic structure [that] represents the quintessentially underdeveloped society. Its most pervasive characteristic is a kind of generalized, persistent, and seemingly insurmountable impotence: it is incapable of performing as an integrated social or political system, as an economy, or as a military structure. Possessing all the external trappings of modernity, this society nevertheless lacks the inner force, organization, and consciousness which characterize truly modern formations. 65 Sharabi diˆers from al-çAzm (and most other male Arab modernists) in his explicit attention to gender. He directly associates patriarchal structures with tradition and views a more egalitarian restructuring of the family and gender and sexual relations as part of the modernist quest. Quoting the Egyptian feminist Nawal Sadaawi, he argues that change in the gender order requires "new modes of upbringing, based on complete equality between men and women in all stages of life, from birth to death, an equality in rights and duties inside the home and outside it and in the education of children." 66 Sharabi views an Arab women's liberation movement as a potential "detonator" that, if "allowed to grow and come into its own, . . . will become the permanent shield against patriarchal regression, the cornerstone of future modernity." 67 The three major leftist-nationalist parties working in the Palestinian arena in the post-1967 period-the Communist Party (CP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)-shared this belief in Arab "backwardness," indicating that the assessment of the conquerors had been internalized by many of the conquered (or, at least, their counter-elites). This view included the conviction that "traditional" identities (familial, village, and religious) had to be superseded by a unitary nationalist identity that would allow for mobilization and eventually lead to a socialist rational-bureaucratic state. 68 For example, Leila Khaled observed in 1971:
As a member of the Arab Nationalist Movement, I was trained to be conscious of the past, present and future. Under-developed people and societies typically lack an awareness of the present and the future, but such consciousness is imperative if we are to be masters of our own lives and environment. We cannot overcome the past and its crippling ideologies unless we gain a free consciousness. Under-developed people live by fate; they look with nostalgia to a "golden past." My people and I suˆer from these debilities, but we are also living in the ongoing process of history and are trying to determine our future rather than bind ourselves to a dead past. The value of the conquest of Palestine by imperialism and Zionism is that it forced some of us to re-examine the foundation of our society on our own. We discovered that our society was rotten, traditional, unprogressive. Our defeat was indeed our salvation, our means of regeneration and renewal. 69 With women's increasing nationalist (including military) activity and the movement's intensi˜ed mobilization needs in the post-1967 period in Jordan and Lebanon, these parties addressed gender-related issues on an ad hoc basis. 70 For example, women's increased exposure to the possibility of sexual assault in the context of political activity intensi˜ed slogans such as "land before honor." 71 However, the slogan "merely prioritized nationalism over 'honor' [invested in the control of women's bodies and sexual activity]." 72 Nor did this slogan address women's structural subordination to men in marriage, child custody, inheritance, mobility, economic dependence, and a gendered division of labor. As Peteet notes:
Palestinian women were mobilized less with the intention of informing a new division of labor and more with the intention that they serve in a support capacity to operate the social institution of the Resistance and as part of a concerted plan to enhance, but not radically alter, the social standards of the Palestinian community. Their participation in formal politics became an indicator of modernization, radicalism, progressiveness, and social development and a sign of the rejection of the "backward past," which Palestinians, intellectuals and ordinary people alike, often assign saliency in facilitating Zionist control over Palestine. 73 The transformation of gender relations was not a clearly articulated aspect of the modernizing agenda in any of these parties until leftist-nationalist women raised challenges beginning in the late 1970s. Even then, the parties remained inconsistent with respect to their ideologies and practices regarding gender. Especially when challenged by female activists, the leftist-nationalist parties working in the Palestinian arena interpreted an inequitable gender order as an aspect of the "old ways" that should be changed-women should be able to work in the "productive" sphere of waged work and engage in nationalist activity. But a complete transformation of the gender order was not in most men's interests, especially because of its implications for a gendered division of labor whereby women would remain primarily responsible for housework and child care even if they are also formally employed or politically active in social movements.
This ambivalence over gender can also be explained, to some extent, by the liberal and Marxist traditions that the Palestinian left combined with nationalism. As feminist scholars have demonstrated, the theorization of tradition and modernity by male liberal and Marxist social theorists has often been based on gendered assumptions about the social world. 74 Liberal social theorists, for example, created universalized "modern" categories of citizen and worker that by de˜nition existed in the public sphere and were composed exclusively of men. 75 The rei˜cation of the distinction between public and private spheres facilitated this process. 76 These ideologies have traditionally relegated what occurs in the private sphere to the realm of the "natural," and therefore the immutable, leaving patriarchal relations within the home relatively intact and ignoring the ways in which gender structures and is reproduced in both "spheres."
Marx and Engels also presumed this split, arguing that the important historical, economic, and political processes existed in the public sphere. 77 Rather than addressing gender as another axis of inequality, Marx and Engels reduced women's oppression within the family to the rise of private property, making it an epiphenomenon of capitalism that would be transformed with women's incorporation into the public sphere. 78 Indeed, Marx appeared to retain "an idealized notion of family relationships [that were] . . . tainted by capitalist economic relationships." 79 This gendered public-private division is salient in Arab modernist discourses generally, 80 including feminist discourses. When male Palestinian leftists address gender inequality, they often see it as an epiphenomenon of national or class oppression. 81 Women's liberation, in turn, is seen as largely dependent on women's participation in waged work in the public sphere and is often distinguished from sexual freedom or a transformation of the gendered division or labor, the latter two being associated with Western feminist discourses. 82 504ıFrances S. Hasso 
CONCLUSION
In response to Arab defeats during the 1948 and 1967 wars, modernists became concerned with overcoming what they perceived as an important cause of these defeats: economic, political, and social "backwardness." These Arab accounts called for "modernization": the transformation of dependent into advanced economies, and of village and clan-based politics into political orders based on a modern, unitary (sometimes pan-Arab) nationalist identity. Although these were often defensive strategies in response to a dramatically unequal international economic and political order, as well as to crises in the Arab world, Arab modernists generally failed to recognize that there are emancipatory and repressive possibilities in both "modernist" and "traditional" projects. Modernity, in these accounts, signi˜es emancipation, freedom, agency, and dynamism, in contrast to tradition, which signi˜es oppression, bondage, passivity, and stagnation, thus reproducing Orientalist distortions. 83 Although the modernists discussed in this article have strongly opposed the European colonizing project, they generally have not examined the complicated nature of the modernity-tradition discursive framework. Aziz al-Azmeh's critique of European representations of "Islam" in Europe is applicable to many modernist Arab accounts of their own societies:
[A]mong the permanent acquisitions of the social and human sciences is the realization that ideological and other forms of collective representation are unthinkable without internal change and structural bearing. . . . [T]his acquisition is almost invariably put to use in the study of contemporary ideologies, mass movements, and other phenomena of European histories and realities. But it is not generally put to use regarding phenomena islamica, which are regarded as generically closed, utterly exotic, repellently mysterious, utterly exceptionalist. 84 Rather than being "deeply rooted," ideas and phenomena deemed "traditional" or "modern" are often socially constructed and continuously rearticulated. As Eric Hobsbawm has argued, "traditions" are often invented for modern purposes. 85 Moreover, even when derived from indigenous or pre-colonial practices, traditions are continuously rearticulated within speci˜c historical and cultural contexts.
Just as "traditional" and "modernist" projects can take multiple directions, equating modernity with women's emancipation and tradition with women's oppression is also problematic. On the one hand, modernity is assumed to require the restructuring of social and political relations and institutions, and in its Enlightenment formulation it is premised on challenging the "authority of tradition, custom, and the status quo." 86 In this way, it has emancipatory possibilities for any group whose oppression is legitimized by tradition, custom, or the status quo, because it calls these premises into question.
On the other hand, what is discursively cast as modern has often reproduced, rearticulated, and legitimized gender inequality. Modernist projects also create their own mythologies, which are naturalized and posited as truths-such as the idea of essential, unitary identities based on group membership (national, gender, sexual, linguistic, racial-ethnic, or class) and the idea that the appropriate identity merely needs to be awakened. This ignores the ways in which identities, like traditions, are "modern" articulations serving contemporary (and sometimes valid) purposes. Moreover, the formal constructions of these identities, usually undertaken by the intellectual elite or self-appointed leaders of a group, often require a disciplining that attempts to repress, subsume, or reconstruct pre-existing worldviews, as well as other locations and identities, which are often posited as threatening the survival of the group. A now substantial body of literature demonstrates, for example, that gender inequality appears to be a constitutive ingredient of nationalist ideologies and practices, although this aspect of nationalism is often contested by women nationalists. 87 Finally, it seems crucial that a scholarly revisiting of the 1948 and 1967 wars recognize that consideration of gender and an interrogation of national identity may transform and complicate the stories told about these events. Still missing are the voices and concerns of girls and women who became refugees in 1948 and 1967. As Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin have noted with respect to the historical narrations of the 1947 Partition of India, the use of Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh women's narratives allow the women, speaking for themselves, to be heard-sometimes challenging, sometimes agreeing with, sometimes probing historical "facts," insinuating themselves into the text and thereby compelling a diˆerent reading of it. The juxtaposition of documented history and personal history forces a re-examination of what James Young calls the "activity of telling history itself," and of recognizing that the "legitimacy of historical sources cannot rest solely on their actual element." This kind of knowledge . . . is imbued . . . with the profound understanding that [the] meaning [of historical events] can never be settled. 88 Why did Palestinian women leave in 1948 and 1967? How did they variously experience this leave-taking as women, as Palestinians, as villagers, as nationalists, as peasants, as bourgeois city folk, as Muslims or Christians, as students, as sisters, as wives, as mothers, or as daughters? What do they think about "honor," the "uprooting," and "land before honor"? These questions should be addressed, not as stories that are marginal to the "more important facts" about 1948 and 1967, but as part of the way these periods are reconstituted and reconsidered. 
